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Introduction
In the development of any large scale space-
based multi-piece assembly effort, planning must
include provisions for testing and verification; not
only of the individual pieces but also of the pieces
together. Without such testing on the ground, the
risk to cost, schedule and technical performance
increases substantially.
This paper will review the efforts undertaken by
the International Space Station (ISS), including
the International Partners, during the pre-launch
phase, primarily at KSC, to reduce the risks
associated with the on-orbit assembly and
operation of the ISS.
Evolution of Philosophy
In any complex program, there is a natural pull or
competition between designers and testing and
verification (T&V) personnel. This is especially
true concerning integrated testing (i.e. testing
between end items.) Designers naturally think
that a proper design that is adequately analyzed
and properly built has little need for testing;
basically, it will work as designed. T&V personnel
understand the necessity to compensate for
manufacturing and assembly errors that can creep
in and the reality that sometimes things look good
on paper but do not function that way. These
competing philosophies can be complicated with
lean budgets. The development of the ISS was
no exception to this.
As the ISS moved through its design and redesign
phases, as well as budget battles, the design
centers espoused a ship and shoot philosophy.
This philosophy stated that the Station elements
would be tested at the factory, closed out, shipped
to KSC, inspected for damage, integrated into the
Space Shuttle then launched. There would be no
integrated testing. Although primarily a design
philosophy, cost and schedule also played a role. 1
Meantime, ground operations personnel at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) understood from
years of experience on Space Shuttle payloads,
that items very seldom arrived ready to launch. In
fact, as the payload community adapted to the
Space Shuttle, the payloads became more
complex requiring more and more T&V at KSC.2
Although much testing was done at the factories,
final integrated testing had to wait until closer to
launch which meant at KSC.
As the discussions went back and forth between
the ground operations personnel at KSC and the
design centers, recognition of the need to do
integrated testing gradually took hold. One issue
that influenced the change was a 1991
Government Accounting Office study that
criticized the fact that each of the four NASA
design centers used their own standards in
designing their elements.3 This meant there was
less of a chance of an element which performed
well at the factory would perform well when
hooked up to its "neighbor" on orbit. Finally, KSC
personnel developed an alternate philosophy that
stated that KSC would have the capability to test
in the event ship and shoot didn't work. 4 As it
turned out this capability was fully used as
schedules and costs drove more testing at KSC.
As Station elements started moving from drawing
board to reality, KSC championed testing that
would demonstrate the elements actually
connected properly and worked together. This
idea was borrowed from The Boeing Company's
experience with the 777. The 777 testing
philosophy started out in the same manner as
Station's - "quality· would be designed in. There
would be little need for flight testing. The 777
went on to become one of the most heavily tested
aircraft in history.s To help with the Station
elements KSC formed teams to visit and work in
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the manufacturing plants. Ground Support
Equipment was readied at KSC to perform testing
as needed.
Finally, with delays on the Russian side of Station
and another Program re-organization, fully
integrated testing became a reality. This testing
was called Multi-Element Integrated Testing or
MElT. MElT was designed to test the physical,
electrical and fluid connections for those elements
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under test. MElT also differed from other testing
in that it would be NASA run with contractor
support. 7
The International Partners were also able to take
advantage of the MElT process during their time
at KSC. This was particular truly due to the
schedule delays associated with the loss of the
Space Shuttle Columbia. Taking advantage of
this down time, the Partners were able to ship
their elements to KSC to participate in MElT that
otherwise would not have been possible.
Testing Regimes for Sub-Elements
MElT was designed for the testing of the major
elements of the ISS. But what about sub-
elements such as payload racks and payloads?
These items depend on the ISS infrastructure to
provide the necessary services much as a
building does on the ground. To test these items,
two primary pieces of Ground Support Equipment
were developed -, the Payloads Test & Checkout
System (PTCS) and the Partial Rack Check-out
Unit (PRCU).
The PTCS included a large fixed unit, the United
States International Standard Payload Rack
(ISPR) Check-out Unit (USICU), located in the
Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF).8 The
unit provided full scale testing of ISPRs with their
associated payloads or facilities. The purpose
was the same as the MElT discussed above; that
is, make sure things worked before going on orbit.
Although some 7 individual racks were tested, the
USICU was never used to full capacity; Le. a full
complement of MPLM racks at one time, before
decommissioning.9 The reason was that the
traffic model it was based on never materialized
due to budget constraints and the end of the
Shuttle program.
The PRCU was the follow-on system. This
smaller unit, of which there are several located at
different sites, provides sufficient testing capability
to ensure payloads meet their on-orbit
performance characteristics. The PRCU is
operated by NASA personnel who also gain
hands-on experience in handling payloads. While
many payloads are nearly ship and shoot, the
additional time spent undergoing PRCU testing
pays dividends in ensuring on-orbit safety and
mission success. 10
On-Orbit Anomaly Testing
As the ISS grew on orbit with the addition of
different elements, failures and anomalies began
to occur. While similar elements were at KSC,
engineers were able to examine and run limited
tests to validate design solutions. Additionally,
flight crews, especially EVA personnel, were able
to see similar hardware to that which was on orbit.
Also as word was received of on-orbit issues,
testing for such issues were incorporated into
ground testing, whether it was MElT or stand-
alone testing.
Issues Detected and Corrected During MElT
As would be expected, numerous issues were
identified as a result conducting MElT.
• Perhaps the biggest area that benefited
from MElT was Command & Data
Handling (C&DH). This being a heavily
software-dependent function, it is perhaps
not surprising. Two examples of issues
that were discovered and resolved:
During the initial power-up of Node-1,
everything shut down. Had this happened
on-orbit, months possibly would have
been spent troubleshooting. 11 As it was, it
only took a much shorter period of time to
find and repair the problem.
While testing the US Lab and in particular
its interfaces with the Integrated Truss
Structure, C&DH issues were discovered,
that had they gone undetected, would
have necessitated the return of the Lab
from on-orbit, repairs conducted, then
relaunched. 12
• While mechanical, electrical and fluid
issues were identified and corrected,
none were as significant as the C&DH
issues. Identification of these types of
problems, enabled on-orbit assembly to
proceed in a much smoother manner. For
example, under MElT, the rails for the
Space Station Robotic Manipulator
System Mobile Base Structure were
tested for alignment and corrections were
made. This process was much simpler on
the ground.
Safety's Role in ISS Integrated Testing
Given that MElT was a NASA run test, the role of
Safety shifted from one of review of Contractor
analysis to the role of actually conducting the
analysis. For contractor operations, the contractor
provided a safety data package prepared in
accordance with ISS requirements. This package
was reviewed and approved by the Ground Safety
Review Panel (GSRP).
For MElT, a new process was developed. As the
elements themselves had already been through
the GSRP, only the new interfaces and Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) (such as connectors
and hoses) unique to the testing needed to be
analyzed. GSE that belonged to KSC was subject
to its own review process.
To accomplish this analysis, NASA Safety
adapted the Integrated Cargo Hazard Analysis
process that was being used in the Space Shuttle
Program. This process consisted of assessing
the equipment against 10 generic hazards and
determining that the hazards were properly
controlled. This analysis was then reviewed and
approved by NASA Safety Management. This
process was able to leverage already existing
work done through the GSRP and isolate only
those items that were unique to the MElT.
Additionally, NASA Safety Operations maintained
oversight of the testing including reviewing of the
hazardous procedures.
Summary
For almost any multi-component project,
integrated testing is vital in discovering faults
within the system prior to its deployment.
Although it took several years of discussions,
MElT for ISS was finally accepted and
immediately proved its worth. This worth was so
great that MElT became part of the normal routine
of pre-launch testing at KSC, including the
International Partner elements.
Safety's adaption of existing processes and data,
allowed a relatively simple process to be
developed that ensured that those new items
brought by MElT received the appropriate review.
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Introduction
Philosophy
• Natural competition between Design and Test and
Verification (T&V) .
- Designers - Work as designed
- T&V - Errors
- Complicated by lean budgets
• Ship and Shoot
- Test at factory
- Closed out
- Shipped to KSC
- Inspection/Integration into Shuttle
- Launch
• No integrated testing
• Ship and shoot had not worked for large payloads
- Did work for mid-deck size payloads
- Payloads became more complex to meet Shuttle capability
• Gradual change away for ship and shoot
- 1991 General Accounting Office Study
• Different sets of design standards
• Alternate philosophy proposed by KSC
- Develop capability in case ship and shoot didnJt work out




• KSC push for Integrated Testing
- Boeing 777
- In plant KSC personnel
• Fully Integrated Testing
- Multi-Element Integrated Testing (MElT)
• Physical} Mechanical} Fluid connections
- NASA run vice contractor




- Payloads Test & Checkout System (PTCS)
• United States International Standard Payload Rack
(ISPR) Check-out Unit (USICU)
- La rge fixed unit
- Test multiple racks
- Never fully utilized
- Partial Rack Checkout Unit (PRCU)
• Follow-on to PTCS
• Drawer/Payload level
• NASA operated
• Failures began to occur with assemblYI as to
be expected
• Other similar elements on the ground
- Run limited tests to troubleshoot or validate fixes
- EVA Crews get near hands-on
On-Orbit Anomalies
MElT Issues
• Command & Data Handling
- Software-dependent function
• Initial Node-l power up turned out to be power down
• US Lab connections with the Integrated Truss Structure
- If undetected, return and relaunch
• Mechaonical/Electrical/Fluid
- Typical discrepancies
- Mobile Base Structure rails
Safety
• Change in role
- NASA run vice contractor
- For contractor operations} reviewed and approved by
the Ground Safety Review Panel
- Major units already approved
• New analysis developed
- Used Shuttle developed process
- Reviewed and approved by NASA Safety Management
- Leveraged existing work
• NASA Safety Operations maintained oversight
Summary
• Integrated testing is vital
• MElT so valuable, it became standard testing
• Safety adapted existing processes and data
- Allowed simpler process
• Test as you fly, fly as you test
